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INTRODUCTION
"It is only with Cuba that America continues the Cold War."'
When President Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton)2 into law on March 12, 1996 he un-
leashed a firestorm of international opposition.' Canada led the vociferous con-
1. THOMAS G. PATERSON, CONTESTING CASTRO: THE UNtrD STATES AND THE TRIUMPH
OF THE CUBAN REvoLUTION 263 (1994) (quoting an unnamed Cuban official). Paterson con-
cludes with the question whether Cuba and the United States could attempt to resolve their
differences as others, such as the Israelis and Palestinians, along with the United States
and Vietnam, have done. ld.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021) [herein-
after Helms-Burton]. The legislation is named for the Act's sponsors, Senator Jesse Helms
(R-NC) and Representative Dan Burton (R-IN). President Clinton's signature of Helms-
Burton signified a complete policy reversal after a year of stringent Administration lobby-
ing against the law, fueling speculation that the President's drive for Florida's electoral
votes in the November 1996 election motivated his policy about-face, Hugh Davies,
Clinton Goes for Votes with Cuba Blockade U-Turn, DAILy TELEGRAP Mar. 13, 1996, at
11. The February 24, 1996 shootdown of two civilian aircraft by Cuban MiGs provided the
President's official impetus. See Helms-Burton, supra, § 116 (relating congressional find-
ings on Havana's downing of the airplanes in a special section of the law entitled, "Con-
demnation of Cuban Attack on American Aircraft"). Canada immediately joined the United
States in deploring the shootdown, disagreeing only with the way in which the Americans
responded. CANADLAN DEu"T OF FOREIGN AFAiRS AND INT'L TRADE, CANADA CoNDmNs
CUBA'S DOWNING OF U.S. AmCRAFT (1996).
3. See Peter Moeron, The U.S. Shouldn't Be Stunned That its Allies Don't Back Cuba
Policy, FIN. POST, June 22, 1996, at 21 (describing Washington as alone in its belief that
Helms-Burton constitutes sound foreign policy); see also Tom Carter & Warren P. Strobel,
Clinton, Hill Unite on Cuba; Deal Reached on Stringent Sanctions Bill, WASH. TIMEs,
Feb. 29, 1996, at Al (elaborating on the negative foreign response to Helms-Burton). In
rebuttal, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) noted: "The ambassadors from Can-
ada and Britain are going nuts. Our allies have to choose whether to play footsy with Fidel
or have access to the U.S. market." Id. at A14. Due to spatial constraints, this Comment
focuses solely on Canadian reaction to Helms-Burton, but signals to the reader that Mex-
ico, the Organization of American States (OAS), Britain, Spain, and the European Union
either passed or currently are considering blocking legislation. Helms-Burton also is the
subject of a European Union (EU) complaint at the World Trade Organization (WTO). See
Clinton Extends His Suspension of Title III of Cuba Law: Canada Weighs NAFTA Action,
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 42 (Jan. 8, 1997) (noting that the WTO agreed to the EU's re-
quest for a dispute settlement panel on November 20, 1996); Paul Blustein and Anne
Swardson, U.S. Vows to Boycott P70 Panel: Move Escalates Fight With European Union
Over Cuba Sanctions, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at Al, A12 (noting the American posi-
tion that the issue is one of foreign policy, rather than trade, and is, thus, improperly before
the WTO). At present, however, the EU challenge is suspended, pending European and
American concrete efforts at increased, mutual understanding. See EU Suspends Effort to
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demnation that sounded almost immediately from prominent American trade, po-
litical, and strategic allies around the world.' The multinational consensus is that
the legislation violates international law and is bad foreign policy and is success-
ful only in its alienation of important American friends.5
Canada and the United States have a solid, if imperfect, bilateral relationship,
evidenced by cooperation in several arenas.6 Recent developments such as the
1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA)' and the 1994 North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) deepen and codify already strong
economic ties.' Trade and foreign policies diverge, however, when Cuba becomes
Challenge in WTO Helms-Burton Legislation, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 742 (Apr. 23,
1997).
4. See Lorraine Woellert, Allies Complain of "Chilling Effect," WASH. Txtns, Aug.
6, 1996, at Al (noting the continuing condemnation from the international community of
America's unilateralist approach and unfavorably comparing the range of discretionary
powers afforded the office of the president under Helms-Burton with that provided in other
legislation).
5. See U.S. Trend Toward Unilateral Action "Disturbing," Canadian Official Says,
13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 613 (Apr. 10, 1996) (quoting Canadian official vio decries the
United States's "selective [American] adherence to the rule of law").
6. See generally MARcL .& VnCENT RIGBY, LmRRY OF PARLImiar RrESEARH
BRANcH, C rAN-A macAN RELATIoNs, Current Issue Rev. No. 79-34E (1992) (recog-
nizing the primarily positive nature of the relationship between Canada and the United
States). The publication provides an overview addressing trade and investment, energy,
environment, maritime boundaries, and fishery concerns. Id. It also includes a survey of
then-recent action taken by the Canadian Parliament vis-d-vis its southern neighbor. Id.
The publication further notes that the extent of contacts between Canada and the United
States implies that there necessarily will be disagreements but that both parties generally
are amenable to their rapid resolution, given the importance of bilateral ties. Id.
7. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement; Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, 27
LL.Mi 281 (1988) [hereinafter CFTA]. See generally Ann Carlsen, Note, The Canada
United States Free Trade Agreement: A Bilateral Approach to the Reduction of Trade Bar-
riers, 12 SuFFoLK TRTANsNA'L L.J. 299 (1989) (providing an overview of the agreement).
Carlsen addresses the evolution of Canadian-American trade relations in a sometimes tur-
bulent century and focuses on the agreement's removal of trade barriers to services and its
establishment of a detailed mechanism for the settlement of disputes. Id.; see also Jean
Raby, The Investment Provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement: A
Canadian Perspective, 84 Ai. 3. brrr'L L. 394, 394 (1990) (noting that the agreement waNs
the culmination of a hard-fought process dating back to 1854 and the brief life of the Elgin-
Marcy Reciprocity Treaty, Which provided for the free exchange of natural products b2-
tween Canada and the United States).
8. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 LLIL
289 and 32 IL.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; see RALPH H. FoLsO.. & W. DAVIS
FoLso, UNDERSTANDiNG NAFTA AND rrs Ia mTiNAONAL BusMnss I.LCAro:s (1996)
(providing a detailed description of Canadian, American, and Mexican history, legal tradi-
tions, and business relationships prior to NAFTA and explaining the agreement; its im-
plementation, and its ramifications for the developing and potentially expanding North
American market).
9. John Whalley & Colleen Hamilton, The Intellectual Underpinnings of North
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the subject." Canada" engages in extensive commerce with Havana"2 and em-
ploys a policy of affirmative engagement to demonstrate, inter alia, the independ-
ence of Canadian foreign policy.' 3 The United States pursues an opposite agenda,
fighting Havana's lack of democracy with economic sanctions designed to deny
resources to the socialist regime, which is desperate for capital. 4
Ottawa perceives Helms-Burton as an effort to infringe upon Canadian sover-
American Economic Integration, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43 (1995) (elaborating on the
origins of the free trade agreements and their underlying objectives, while assessing their
effect and contrasting the North American experience with gradations of economic inte-
gration with that of the Europeans).
10. See James Morrison, Helms-Burton Critic, WASH. TINs, June 5, 1996, at A15
(relating remarks of the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Raymond Chretien,
criticizing the Helms Burton law). The Ambassador noted:
Canada and the United States share the goal of a peaceful, democratic transition in Cuba, the ht un-
democratic bastion in this hemisphere .... [W]hile the United States advocates a policy of isolation,
Canada advocates a policy of engagement. While the United States advocates an embargo to pressure
the Cuban government to open its society to political change, Canada advocates commercial engage-
meat, which we believe will make economic and political change inevitable .... We recognize that it
is the United States' sovereign prerogative to conduct its foreign policy as it sees fit. We ask for no
less from the United States.
Id.
11. See CuBAN AmERIcAN NATIO NAL FOUNDATION, CUBA'S HAu. OF SHANE (released to
members of the press on March 15, 1996 by Marc Thiessen, Press Spokesman for the
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) (undated copy on file with author).
According to this list, Canada is only one of many nations trading with Cuba. Id. The list
includes Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, China, the Domini-
can Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Honduras, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Ja-
maica, Japan, Mexico, Panama, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
Venezuela. Id.
12. See CANADIAN DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INT'L TRADE, BACKOROUNDER ON
U.S. HELMS-BURTON LEGISLATION (1996) (relating that trade between Canada and Cuba
grew by 54% from 1994-95, Canadian exports to Cuba during this period grew from Can.
$115 million to Can. $254.5 million, and Canadian imports from Cuba grew from Can.
$194 million to Can. $320.9 million); Howard Schneider, Canada and Cuba: Booming
Partners-Despite U.S. Obstacles, Trade, Diplomacy Flourish, WASH. POST, Oct. 20,
1996, at Al, A24 (describing the win-win perspective that both Canada and Cuba take on
their relationship). Without competition from American investors, Canadians are able to
reap huge financial profits. Id. Similarly, Cuba is able to benefit from a relationship with
prosperous Canada and receive much-needed grants and loan guarantees, such as those
required for the financing of the new air terminal in Havana. Id.
13. See Christopher Marquis, Canada Sees Cuba's Friendship As Aiding Latin Ameri-
can Trade, J. OF COM., Feb. 10, 1990, at 13A (noting that after the United States, Canada
is the second-largest contributor to the Organization of American States).
14. See generally UNITED STATES ECONOMIC MEASuREs AGAINST CUBA: PROCEEDINGS
INTHE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES (Michael Krinsky & David Golove
eds., 1993) [hereinafter Krinsky & Golove] (providing an excellent description of the
genesis and development of American economic policy toward Cuba, including a chronol-
ogy of legal measures through 1992).
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eignty and force the adoption of American foreign and economic policies."5 After
Canadian diplomats unsuccessfully lobbied Washington against Helms-Burton, 6
the Canadian parliament voted to amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures
Act (FEMA).Y' The FEMA amendment effectively nullifies Helms-Burton in
Canada by creating a cause of action to recover expenses lost as a result of an ad-
verse judgment in the United States and imposing heavy financial penalties upon
any Canadian entity complying with the American law."8
The adoption of completely contradictory regulations by the United States and
Canada necessarily raises the specter of an inevitable collision.'9 Helms-Burton
harms the Canadian-American relationship in spirit."0 Today, however, both
countries are at a crossroads, and their responses to this stalemate Will determine
the extent to which they will allow the dispute to affect both their bilateral rela-
tionship and NAFTA. One path of increasing conflict regarding Cuba sets the
stage for a diplomatic, commercial, and litigious war,"' while the other leads to
15. Canadian Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade, Notes for an Address by the
Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister for International Trade, on the Occasion of the Second
Reading of the Bill to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (1996) [hereinaf-
ter Eggleton Address]. The Canadian official stated:
[A]t the most fundamental level [Helms-Burton] is objecionable because it attempts to enforce uni-
formity of approach and to deny the freedom to other nations to make up their oavm mind3 and imple-
ment their ovn policies .... Many years ago, President Kennedy said of the [Canadiam-Amtrican]
relationship... that "geography has made us neighbours, but history has made us fliend" That is
true... but it has notmade usthe 51ststate .... Our foreigapolicyand our tradepolicyare mad in
Ottawa-not Washirgton.
Id. at 1.
16. See Carol Goar, Canada Tries to Kill U.S. Anti-Cuban Legislation: Ambassador
Launches Phone Blitz of Senators in Lobby Effort, ToRoNTo STAR, Oct. 12, 1995, at A22
(recognizing Canada's slim chance of victory in the face of opposition from then Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole and the organized and powerful Cuban-American community in
Florida).
17. An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Bill C-54, 35th Parl.
(1996). This bill vas introduced to the House of Commons on Sept. 16, 1996, passed by
the House on Oct 9, 1996, passed by the Canadian Senate on Nov. 28, 1996, and became
law on January 1, 1997. An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act,
R-S.C., ch. F-29 (1996) (Can.) [hereinafter FEMAAmendment].
18. See discussion infra part ILB (describing the FEMA).
19. See Howard Schneider, Canadians Fire Back at U.S. Lw Helms Burton Retort
Passes Unanimously, WAs. PosT, Oct. 10, 1996, atA41 (noting that the bill initially vs
expected to pass the Canadian Senate without delay and enter into force rapidly thercaf-
ter). Canada explicitly took legislative action to make the option of suing under Title ll
less attractive to potential American litigants. Id. at A43.
20. See Charles Trueheart, U.S. Alarms Canada With Cuba Shit; Ottawa Protests
ProposedBill, WASH. PosT, Apr. 1, 1995, at A17 (relating that Harvard Latin America ex-
pert, Jorge Dominguez, called Helms-Burton "the Canada-Bashing Act of 1995"). Bill
Graham, the head of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Canadian House of
Commons, expressed worry about the American attitude of punishing other countries vrho
do not play by Washington's rules. Id. at A22.
21. See discussion infra part IB.3 (discussing Title I of Helms-Burton, which pro-
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
the cooperative fashioning of a joint and proactive approach toward Havana. 2
One cannot deny the urgent need for increased economic and political liberties
and human rights for the Cuban people. 3 The operative question is how can
Canada and the United States best work together to achieve their mutual goal of
fostering a democratic Cuba?
The purpose of this Comment is to delve into Canadian objections and re-
sponses to Helms-Burton and discuss their impact on the overarching Canadian-
American rapport. Part I surveys the bilateral relationship between Canada and
the United States and explores their very different approaches to Cuba. Part II
analyzes Ottawa's objections to Helms-Burton, samples the American response
regarding the legitimacy of the legislation, and chronicles Canada's legal action
against the American law on both its domestic legal front and in international
dispute resolution fora. Part Im suggests that Helms-Burton is not the most con-
structive legislative answer to America's need for a forward looking Cuban policy,
but rather that it threatens a further cooling of relations with Canada, a destabili-
zation of the international climate for investment and trade, and potentially fruit-
less litigation. This Comment concludes by advocating the formation of an effec-
tive Canadian-American policy of constructive cooperation designed to promote
democracy in Cuba.
I. CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS BEFORE HELMS-
BURTON: NO BETTER FRIENDS, YET DIFFERENT OUTLOOKS
TOWARD HAVANA
A. THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A SOLID COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP
GROWING STRONGER AND CODIFIED IN NAFTA
Business ties between the United States and its northern neighbor are extensive
vides a cause of action in American courts against those "trafficking" in expropriated
American assets). See also discussion infra part II.B (regarding FEMA's creation of a
cause of action in Canadian courts for those against whom an adverse Helms-Burton judg-
ment is rendered in the United States). Canada devised its law to "clawback" the value of
any award and court costs. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
22. See U.S. Hopes Canada Will Help Win Democracy for Cuba, Envoy Says, 13 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1364 (Sept. 4, 1996) (quoting an American official as being "cautiously
optimistic" that Canada and the United States can fashion a mutually acceptable plan to
overcome Cuban totalitarianism). Such a policy should concern itself with how best to
promote democracy on the island today, not twenty-five years down the road.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 23 (1995), reprinted in part in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 528 (citing reports by Amnesty International and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights about the continuing political and social repression of the Cuban people). It
is imperative to note that this Comment's criticism of the technical flaws in Helms-
Burton's construction and its foreign policy ramifications in no way implies support for
Castro or fails to recognize the human rights violations that his regime perpetrates.
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and involve approximately U.S. $272 billion a year.2  Two-way trade in goods,
services, and income increased by one-third between 1989 and 1993, when the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CFTA)"5 entered into force."'
Drafters of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) based many of
its provisions on those already in existence in the CFTA, which NAFTA super-
seded on January 1, 1994.2 North America as a whole is experiencing an expan-
sive movement toward the establishment of a continental economy, exemplified by
the increasing integration and interdependence between Canada, the United
States, and Mexico.2"
In foreign affairs, a mixture of American dominance and Canadian assertions
of independence characterize the Canadian-American relationship.2 9 The politi-
cal, military, and cultural strength of the United States tilts the scales in its fa-
vor.3" This balance of power equation fosters debate as to whether Ottawa's ne-
24. See Judith Hippler Bello et al., Annual Review of Significant Developments: 1995
- International Trade, 30 INT'L LAwYER 391,411 (1996) (noting that Canada was the des-
tination for 22% of American exports and the source for 20% of its imports).
25. CFTA, supra note 7. Congressional goals listed in the 1974 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2486 (1994) include free trade with Canada. See FoLsom & FoLsom, supra note 8, at 65
(noting that Congress found a trade agreement with Canada to be critical to continued eco-
nomic stability between the two countries); id. at 79-83 (setting forth a thorough descrip-
tion of the contents, objectives, scope, and basic commitments of the CFTA).
26. EMBASSY OF CANADA, CANADA-UNrrmD STATES: Tim WoRLD's LARGEST TRaDnm:
RELATONSH (1996).
27. UNIrED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1996 NATIO AL TRAD- E.sriTE:
CANADA (1996) (visited Oct. 9, 1996) <http'J/wvw.ustr.gov/reportslntel19961canada.
html>.
28. See NAFTA, supra note 8, preamble (listing resolutions to Which Canada, Mexico,
and the United States pledge themselves in the context of the free trade agreement). This
list includes contributing to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade,
acting as catalysts to broaden international cooperation, and maintaining a predictable
commercial framework for business planning and investment Id.; see also Alan K. Hen-
rikson, The US. "North American" Trade Concept: Coninentalist Hemispherist, or
Globalist?, in TowAu) A NoRaT AiEICN Con;MNrrY?, 155, 155-56 (Donald Barry et
al. eds., 1995) (noting that the movement toward economic integration includes a debate
about the proper "widening" or "deepening" of the agreement and Naether it should be
continental, hemispheric, or global in nature).
29. See Denis Stairs, Change in the Management of Canada-United States Relations
in the Post-War Era, in ToWARD ANORTHATI cAN CmOc.. rry? 54-56 (Donald Barry et
al eds., 1995) (noting that Canada's awareness of its powerMful southern neighbor causes it
to seek international influence in multilateral venues). Stairs also identifies the cultivation
of relationships with diverse countries as a second prong of Canadian foreign policy. Id. at
56. Stairs then illustrates this point with an excerpt from a 1968-70 government foreign
policy review vherein Ottawa noted "the constant danger that sovereignty, independence
and cultural identity may be impaired [by American influences and that a]ctive pursuit of
trade diversification... will be needed to provide countervailing factors." Id. at 57.
30. See Lloyd Axworthy, Foreign Policy at a Crossroad, Address to the Standing
Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade (visited Apr. 16, 1996) <http'JAvv,v.dfait
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gotiation of closer ties with Washington via NAFTA is a capitulation of sorts3" or,
rather, an attempt to gain equal footing and preserve Canadian sovereignty. 2
B. DI V ENT CUBAN PoiciEs
1. Canada: Opportunity Knocks
The collapse of the Soviet empire left Cuba without the international benefac-
tor that provided four-fifths of Cuba's imports and sustained Havana in the face of
the American trade embargo. 3 Cuba responded to the reality of its post-Cold
War economic situation by flirting with aspects of a market economy. 4 The For-
eign Investment Act of 1995"s provided a legal basis for the opening of the busi-
ness community." Cuba's Foreign Investment Act is only a beginning, but it al-
lows the country increased opportunities for capital infusions, transfers of
technology and management know-how, and gradual assimilation into the global
economy. 7 Many foreign investors find themselves drawn to Havana, and cur-
rent trade estimates cite approximately 240 joint ventures throughout thirty-four
.maeci.gc.ca.english/news/statem-l/96_state/96/012e.html> (describing the Canadian-
American relationship as the world's most successful, but not immune from an inequality
in terms of population and economic power).
31. See Lawrence Martin, Continental Union, 538 A.NNALs AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
Sci. 143, 143 (1995) (arguing that Canada's embrace of economic integration with the
United States will result in joint political management and meaningless borders).
32. See Stairs, supra note 29, at 69 (discussing the viewpoint that perhaps the nego-
tiation of a bilateral trade agreement with the United States was a preferable guarantor of
independence as compared to a gradual drift toward assimilation).
33. See Krinsky & Golove, supra note 14, at 129 (finding that Cuba's trade dependent
economy and people are struggling to survive the current economic crisis, the worst since
the Revolution in 1959).
34. See Anna Szterenfeld, Foreign Investment Increases: Economic Reform Under
Way, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 1996, at S3 (noting that the Cuban economy finally is starting to
show signs of recovery, following five years of 35% contraction in gross domestic product
and near eradication of trade).
35. See Ley No. 77: Ley de la Inversion Extranj era (Foreign Investment Act), reprinted
in 35 I.L.M. 331 (1995) [hereinafter CFIA] (providing for the infusion of foreign invest-
ments in all aspects of the Cuban economy except in defense, national security, education,
and public health). The CFIA created three mechanisms by which foreign investment may
be channeled into Cuba: joint ventures, corporations, and economic associations. CFIA,
art. 1. See generally Ron First, Comment, Cuba's Changing Foreign Investment Climate:
Castro's Attempt to Lure Foreign Investors, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 295 (1996) (discussing
the CFIA's purposes, related procedures, and other issues such as taxation and potential
limitations on foreign investment).
36. CFIA, supra note 35, art. 1.
37. See Szterenfeld, supra note 34, passim (noting that although Cuba still faces criti-
cal difficulties that may deter potential investors, such as a shortage of hard currency and a
lack of access to foreign credit, it appears to be on its way to a mixed economy that pro-
vides for both aspects of a free market and a heavy state sector).
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sectors of the Cuban economy. 8
The opening of Cuba's economy provides Canada with a fertile opportunity to
increase trade and investment, a long standing goal of its relationship with
Cuba." Canada pursues a policy of regional engagement in the Caribbean and
Latin America, both as a means to enhance its influence,4 and to underline the
independence of its foreign policy from Washington. 4 Since the 1945 opening of
Canada's embassy in Havana, relations between Canada and Cuba have managed
to surmount, but not ignore, strong differences in political, economic, and strate-
gic philosophies.42 Canadian officials routinely stipulate that the way to open all
aspects of Cuban society is through contact with trading partners, not isolation.4
Canada's trade and investment relationship with Cuba is extensive, involving
over forty Canadian firms and close to U.S. $450 million in two-way trade during
1995."4 Canada became Cuba's foremost commercial partner in 1995."' The year
before, Canada launched an assistance package for Havana, offering advice on the
modernization of key sectors in the economy, such as tax reform and bandng
38. See Marc Cooper, A Conflict of Interests, Wou.DBusmn7ss, May-June 1996, at 20
(noting, inter alia, that billboards that once proclaimed anti-capitalist slogans now tout
commercial products).
39. See Richard V. Gorham, Canada and Cuba: Four and a Half Decades of Cordial
Relations, in CUBA'S Tins TO A CHANGING WORLD 215 (Donna Rich Kaplonitz ed., 1993)
(describing trade as the main element in the Canadian-Cuban relationship).
40. CoNRAD SHEC Er A.., CANAiN DEP'T oF FoREmaN AFAis AIM IT'L TRAns,
CANADA i THEAiMECAs: NEw OPPoRTunEs AND CHA. jmas (1994) (arguing that Can-
ada has a strategic interest in trade and investment in the Americas, a region often over-
looked in the past in favor of the United States and Europe). The authors note that this in-
terest, and the influence that accompanies an increased regional presence, should grow
with any accession to NAFTA. Id.
41. See Eggleton Address, supra note 15; Honard Schneider, Canada and Cuba:
Booming Partners-Despite United States Obstacles, Trade, Diplomacy Flourish, WASH.
PosT, Oct 20, 1996, at Al, A24 (noting that Canada's independent Cuba policy dates back
to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, w hen then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker opposed
President Kennedy's request that Canadian troops be put on alert in anticipation of mili-
tary action).
42. See Gorham, supra note 39, at 215-16, 220-21 (explaining that the Canadian-
Cuban relationship has never been without strains, but noting Canada's active vwork to end
Cuba's isolation in the world community).
43. See John Kirk, A Historical Overview of the Cuba-Canada-U.S. Triangle, in Sym-
posium, Helms-Burton and International Business: Legal and Commercial Implications,
Found. for the Americas and Center for Int'l Pol'y at 9 (May 16-17, 1996) (copy on file
with author) [hereinafter Americas and Intl Pol'y] (stating that Canada and Cuba have
enjoyed a consistent and strong trade relationship since 1899). Kirk asserts that Canada
pursues the goal of increasing trade with several countries in Latin America at a parallel
pace. Id. at 9-10. He further notes that 73% of Canadians stated in a poll that it vs more
important that they follow Canadian, rather than American, law. Id. at 10.
44. Cuba: Canadian Investments in Cuba, CAmBEAN UPDATE, May 1, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
45. Id.
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Despite the fact that most Canadians are bullish about this profitable Caribbean
market,4" Cuban investment draws its share of domestic criticism,48 In the United
States as well, certain American business interests oppose Washington's official
policy and believe that Cuba's geographical proximity and emerging ability to op-
erate in the global market with hard currency make it an excellent candidate for
commercial relations. 9
2. The United States: Castro as an International Pariah
The United States long has employed a system of economic sanctions against
Castro."° Washington's anger at Cuba stems from Havana's non-payment of
46. See Christine Stewart, Address, in Americas and Int'l Pol'y, supra note 43, at 3
(noting the insistence of Canada's Secretary of State for Latin America and Africa that in
negotiations with Cuba her country pursues issues such as human rights, on which the two
disagree). The Secretary further noted that Cuba may respond to laws such as Helms-
Burton by turning inward and engaging in militant nationalism, reversing any progress
made on the fronts of democratic and economic liberalism. Id. at 4.
47. See Schneider, supra note 41, at Al, A24 (illustrating that the Canadian economy,
in general, and firms such as Sherritt International, Genoil, and Delta Hotels have bene-
fited from recent growth in Canada's external trade with Cuba).
48. See Michael Harris, United States Needs Our Friendship, TORONTO SUN, Aug. 8,
1996, at 17 (arguing that Canadian dislike of Helms-Burton has little to do with sover-
eignty and all to do with the desire to make money); see also Arnold Beichman, Castro's
Curious Canadian Comforters, WASH. Tnvms, March 22, 1996, at Al 9 (expressing disgust
for Canada's practice of embracing Castro while his regime violates human rights and
terming those who "traffick" in property to which an American claim attaches, "fences");
Terrence Corcoran, Down With Canada's Fidelistas, GLOBE AND MAIL, Mar. 13, 1996, at
B9 (suggesting that Ottawa end its romance with Cuba); Bob MacDonald, Ottawa Still
Loves Tyrant, ToRoNTo SUN, Feb. 28, 1996, at 20 (arguing that Canadian trade with Cuba
only props up Castro's regime and allows him to oppress the Cuban people); Peter Wor-
thington, Our Shameful Double Standard, ToRoNTo SUN, May 23, 1996, at 11 (suggesting
that Canadians should direct their indignation at those who perpetrated the confiscation,
rather than at the victims who are seeking redress).
49. See Michael D. Kaplowitz & Donna Rich Kaplowitz, Cuba and the United States:
Opportunities Lost and Future Potential, in CUBA'S TiEs TO A CHANGING WoRLD 223, 240-
41 (Donna Rich Kaplowitz ed., 1993) (arguing that the United States has a financial inter-
est in actively pursuing a commercial relationship with Cuba). The authors suggest that
due to missed business deals, the embargo's "opportunity cost" to American investors is
much higher than an annual U.S. $1.3 billion. Id. at 241. It is the most anxious capitalists,
mainly American parent companies of foreign subsidiaries such as Continental Grain, that
advocate an onslaught of American investment in Cuba as soon as possible to avoid a fur-
ther competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis foreign competitors, as Cuba gradually increases its
market reforms. Id. at 234.
50. See Saturnino E. Lucio, 11, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1995: An Initial Analysis, 27 U. MiAm INTER-AM. L. REv. 325, 327
(1995-96) (noting that prior to this piece of legislation, the American economic embargo
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"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation 1 to the American individuals
and corporations whose property the Cuban government expropriated5 2 The
United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) has certified al-
most 6,000 individual property claims against the Cuban government. 3  Al-
though it is Cuba's responsibility to make reparations, the complex system of
American laws created to punish Cuba for its wrongful non-payment does very
little to assist certified claimants in obtaining due compensation. Thirty-eight
years after the Cuban Revolution, political animosity endures between the United
States and Cuba, and the claims remain unpaid.
54
Extraterritorial questions surrounding pre-Helms-Burton American legislation
against Cuba was the product of executive orders issued by U.S. presidents from John
Kennedy to Bill Clinton); Krinsky & Golove, supra note 14, at 92-97 (explicating the
statutory and legislative authorities that enable the Cuban embargo); see also Maria L. Pa-
gan, United States Legal Requirements Affecting Trade With Cuba, 2 TuLSA J. Comp. &
_'¢LL. 289,289-90 (1995) (describing American laws affecting trade with Cuba as a two-
tiered structure, with the first tier being regulations authorizing and implementing the em-
bargo against Cuba and the second tier consisting of more general restrictions on foreign
assistance aimed at Communist countries or states that meet certain designated criteria,
such as those deemed to support terrorism).
51. See Ricam B. LLLcH & BuNs H. WESToN, I 1rE1ovL C.tA.4s: Tuma
SETFLErENTBY Lu, SuMAGR iMnTrs 208 (1975) (directing the reader to the American
Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States for an
elaboration of the meaning of "prompt, adequate, and effective"). As Lillich and Weston
Nwrote the piece in 1975, their referral to the Restatement would be to the RESTATa.mTr
(SECOND) OF FoREaIN RELATIONS LAW OF ThE UN=fED STATES §§ 185-90 (1965). The very
act of defining the requirements for compensation indirectly recognizes the right of a sov-
ereign nation to exercise dominion over properties located in its physical territory and ex-
propriate them as well, as long as the nation provides remuneration. Id.; see also Richard
B. Lillich & Bums H. Weston, Introduction, in hnTmRATIONAL CLAD.s: Co'meo.ARY
EuRoPEAN PRACTICE 10 (Richard B. Lillich & Bums IL Weston eds., 1982) (articulating
the international conventional wisdom of the World War 11 era, during v-iich time several
nations negotiated settlement agreements providing for prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation).
52. See Jonathan R Ratchik, Comment, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
of 1995, 11 AM. U.J. Ifrrr'L L. & POL'y 343, 344-47 (1996) (elaborating on the history of
Cuba's confiscation of American property and the gradual deterioration of relations).
53. See Archibald RM. Ritter, The Compensation Issue in Cuban-United States Nor-
ralization: Who Compensates ho, Why and How?, in CuBA IN THm INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM: NoniALZATIoN AND INTEGRATION 259, 261-63 (Archibald R. M. Ritter & John
MA. Kirk eds., 1995) (noting that as of 1994, the 5911 claims accepted by the Foreign Set-
tlement Claims Commission possessed a collective value of U.S. S5.7 billion).
54. Interview with Orestes Hemandez, Cuban Interests Section, in Wadington, D.C.
(Oct. 14, 1996) [hereinafter Hernandez Interview] (acknowledging Cuba's responsibility to
pay and its willingness to do so provided that a realistic payment schedule or compensation
arrangement is drafted) (transcript on file with author). Housed in the Embassy of Svit-
zerland, the Cuban Interests Section is the official government representative of the Re-
public of Cuba in the United States, in the absence of an embassy and formal diplomatic
relations.
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aimed at Cuba also have generated international controversy.5 The 1992 Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA)"6 served as a prelude to the current international debate. 7
American allies protested 8 the CDA's extension of the United States economic
embargo to overseas subsidiaries of American companies.59 In response to the
CDA, Canada's Attorney General issued the 1992 Foreign Extraterritorial Meas-
ures Order in reference to the United States." It prohibited Canadian subsidiaries
of American corporations from complying with the CDA and effectively nullified
the CDA's impact in Canada.61 Although Canadian-American disagreement re-
garding the alleged extraterritorial nature of the United States's Cuba policy is
nothing new, 2 Helms-Burton attempts to involve third parties further in the
55. Allen DeLoach Stewart, Comment, New World Ordered: The Asserted Extraterri-
torial Jurisdiction of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 53 LA. L. Rv. 1389 (1993) (de-
scribing questions raised in 1992 about the Act and American authority to control the trade
practices of subsidiaries of United States companies domiciled on foreign soil).
56. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), Pub. L. No. 102-484, Title XVII, §§ 1701-
1712, 106 Stat. 2575 (1992) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6001).
57. Manfred Wolf, Hitting the Wrong Guys: External Consequences of the Cuban
Democracy Act, 8 FLA. J. brr'L L. 415, 418 (1993) (advocating a "balancing of interests"
approach when inquiring as to the validity of a nation's assertion of extraterritorial juris-
diction). Such an approach must take into account issues such as the degree to which the
international community approves of the objectives and means of the state wishing to exert
jurisdiction and any effects on the interests of third parties. Id. at 418-19.
58. See Gabriel M. Wilner, International Reaction to the Cuban Democracy Act, 8
FLA. I Irr'L L. 401, 404 (1993) (articulating that American policies toward Cuba affect
much more than the bilateral American-Cuban relationship). See generally Second Annual
International Business Law Symposium, Trading With Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act
and Export Rules, 8 FLA. J. Ir'L L. 335 (1993) (containing responses to the CDA of sev-
eral members of the international academic community).
59. The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), supra note 56, § 1706(a).
60. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, C. Gaz. (1992)
(Can) [hereinafter Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Order]. According to the structure of
Canadian law, Acts of Parliament may authorize the creation of subordinate legal docu-
ments, known variously as "regulations" or "orders." CANADiAN DEP'T JUSTICE, A GUIDE
TO THE MAKiNG OF FEDERAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS 15-16 (1996). Orders or regulations
are not made by Parliament but, rather, by an individual to whom such authority is specifi-
cally delegated. Id. at 15.
61. See Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Order, supra note 60. The relevant text
provides:
No corporation shall comply with an extraterritorial measure of the United States in respect of trade
or commerce between Canada and Cuba or with any directives, instructions, intimations of policy or
other communications relating thereto that are received from a person who is in a position to direct or
influence the policies of the corporation in Canada.
Id.
62. See Jamie Dettmer, Cuba Act Stirs Tempest, WASH. TIMEs, June 17, 1996, at 6
(stating that European diplomats may not rule out a trade and diplomatic war over Helms-
Burton reminiscent of the 1980s trans-Atlantic conflict concerning President Reagan's ef-
fort to prohibit Europeans from selling American-made parts to the Soviet Union for use in
the construction of the trans-Siberian gas pipeline); Sheldon E. Gordon, Pipeline Fallout:
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American-Cuban confrontation and thus promotes instability.63
3. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996
(Helms-Burton)
The United States is like the parent that goes to the kindergar-
ten and spanks other peoples' kids.
-Todd h1alan, Executive Director, Organization for International Irnverai
On February 9, 1995, Senator Jesse Helms introduced the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act" Five days later, Representative Dan Burton pre-
sented the House version." Helms-Burton's sponsors enacted this further anti-
Castro legislation due to, inter alia, serious concerns about the lack of human
rights protections in Cuba."' Other reasons included the perception that Havana's
recent market reforms were superficial and designed only to attract a quick influx
of foreign capital.68 Furthermore, the desire of United States legislators to codify
disincentives to foreign companies whose commerce with Cuba sustained Castro's
Outrage in Canada, Too, CHRisTIAN SCL MOrOR, Sept. 10, 1982, at 22 (stating that nin-
ning the occasional test of wills does nothing to resolve the problem of such extraterritorial
conflicts between the United States and Canada); Michael T. Kaufmian, Lairs Across the
Border Strain United States-Canadian Ties, N.Y. Tnums, Sept. 3, 1982, at 3 (stating that
nowhere in the world does the issue of extraterritoriality enter into a bilateral diplomatic
relationship as it does between the United States and Canada); Frank . Prial, United Na-
tions Votes to Urge United States to Dismantle Embargo on Cuba: A Rebuke to Washing-
ton, N.Y. Tnms, Nov. 25, 1992, at Al (referring to the controversy surrounding the CDA);
Martin Sieff, United States Bill on Cuban Trade Angers Canada, EC, WASLa Tn.aS, Oct
9, 1992, at A7 (stating that the CDA threatened U.S. S500 million a year in business by
European companies investing in Cuba).
63. See discussion infra part LB.3 (describing Title M).
64. See Woellert, supra note 4, at Al (noting that the Organization for International
Investment is a trade association vcaose goal is to represent American subsidiaries of for-
eign businesses); see also Charles Trueheart, French Veterans Reflcct on Old Ally's New
World: Armistice Day Evokes Fond Pas4 Blunt View of United States "Unilateralism,"
WASH. PosT, Nov. 12, 1996, at A9-10 (citing continental fiustration with the unilateral
character of American foreign policy since the fall of the Berlin Wall and cautioning that it
would be "clumsy" for the United States to fail to comprehend this European sentiment).
65. See S. 381, 104th Cong. § 2(5) (1995) (finding in the Senate version of the bill
that Castro has defined democratic pluralism as "garbage!').
66. See 141 CoNG. RFc. H1751 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 1995); see also Ratchk supra note
52, at n.5 and accompanying text (noting that the House version of the bill passed with a
vote of 294-130).
67. See HR. REP. No. 104-202, at 22-23 (1995), reprinted in part in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 527-28 (relating the findings of independent human rights investigatory
organizations as to the lack of freedom of expression on the island).
68. Id. at 23-24 (expressing the belief of the majority of the House Committee that the
current opening of the Cuban economy is based only on the country's dire need for hard
currency and that true free market development is not possible without viable property
rights, something not yet in existence in Cuba).
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regime and whose officers trafficked in confiscated American property led to the
passage of the law. 9 In addition, section 116 of Title I of the Helms-Burton Act
specifically delineates congressional findings regarding the February 24, 1996
downing of airplanes operated by the Miami based Brothers to the Rescue organi-
zation,"° the tragic event most believe caused the Clinton Administration to re-
verse its opposition to the law and join a bipartisan effort for its passage.7
Helms-Burton aims to strengthen economic sanctions against Cuba, encourage
free and fair democratic elections with international supervision, provide a policy
framework for United States support for a post-Castro democratic transition gov-
ernment, and protect certified American property claims.72 Helms-Burton only
manages successfully to achieve the first goal and describe a future framework in
which to accomplish the second and third. Given Canada's recent legislative
measures to combat Title Im, Helms-Burton does little to obtain meaningful relief
for American property claimants who bring suits against Canadians, given the
likelihood that any favorable judgment by an American court will be nullified by a
claim in a Canadian court.73
Title I strengthens the American economic embargo against Cuba by, inter
alia, prohibiting indirect financing of Cuba;7  requiring full implementation of
69. Id. at 24 (taking direct aim at countries "willing to put aside what [they] know
about the Castro regime in exchange for mythical market share"). Senator Jesse Helms is
known to compare world leaders who deal with Fidel Castro to Neville Chamberlain sit-
ting down with Adolf Hitler, then returning to London to declare that there vould be
"peace in our time." UNITED STATES SENATE, CoMMITrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, IN
MIAMI, HELMs BLASTS EUROPEAN UNION, CANADA, MEXICO FOR THREATS OVER CUBA LAW
(1996) (copy on file with author).
70. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 116. Havana's downing of the Brothers to the Res-
cue airplanes was tragic. Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Roberto Robaino's reaction to
then United Nations Ambassador Madelaine Albright's criticism was full of machismo. On
the official website of the Cuban government, Robaino responded with the following:
Ambassador Albright, using highly infrequent language in diplomatic circles, had no qualms in af-
firming with respect to my country. .. that "this was not a matter of 'cajones,' but of cowardice
[sic]." I wish only to respond that we have always had an abundance of the former, and never suffered
from [a] lack of the latter.
Roberto Robaina, Cuban Response to Madeline Albright (visited Oct. 19, 1996)
<http://www.cubaweb.cu/noticias/madeline.html>.
71. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, PRESS RELEASE (Aug. 16,
1996) (copy on file with author); see Robert D. Novak, Courting the Cuban Vote, WASH.
POST, Sept. 30, 1996, at A23 (offering a pundit's take on the role domestic American poli-
tics played in President Clinton's policy reversal); see also Wayne Smith, Background and
Implicationsfor the Future, in Americas and Int'l Pol'y, supra note 43 at 12 (noting then
candidate Bill Clinton's support for the Cuban Democracy Act during the previous presi-
dential campaign in a bid for Florida's electoral votes). Smith also notes President Bush's
political reversal from opposition to support as the election drew near. Id.
72. S. 381, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (noting the objectives for the legislation as de-
scribed when first introduced to the Senate).
73. See infra part lI.B (discussing Canada's "clawback" legislation).
74. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 103.
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sanctions against Havana and nations that assist her as codified in existing
American lavr,"' opposing Cuban membership in international financial institu-
tions or the Organization of American States; 8 reducing assistance to countries of
the former Soviet Union by the amount of aid or credits they provide to Cuba for
the use of intelligence facilities targeting the United States;" and requiring an-
nual reports to Congress on all third-country assistance, joint ventures, and trade
with Cuba.8 As Title I successfully entrenches the sanctions policy against Ha-
vana by codifying all Cuban embargo and executive orders issued since President
Kennedy's term in office,7" only congressional action can alter America's policy
toward Cuba.80 This is a derogation of the flexibility with which the executive
office of the president traditionally has fashioned Cuban policy and it potentially
constitutes congressional usurpation of the executive's power over foreign af-
fairs."
Title H describes the mechanisms for American assistance to a democratic
government following Castro.82 It also delineates steps for the normalization of
relations and the lifting of the economic embargo 3 and details characteristics that
a transitional government must possess to be eligible for American assistance.'
This title is useful in outlining steps toward normalization but is only capable of
emerging as a viable plan for action at some hypothetical time in the future,
should Cuba's political and economic structures evolve to the degree specified in
Title H.8S Title II does nothing to support free and fair elections or a democratic
government today. Furthermore, a nation does not stand on firm ground when it
only selectively views concerns of human rights and democracy as the basis for its
refusal to engage in normalized relations. 6 The latter two of the four titles re-
75. Id. § 102.
76. Id. §§ 104-05.
77. Id. § 106.
78. Id. § 108.
79. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 102.
80. Id. §§ 102(H), 204.
81. WAYNE S. Sifirr, CImm FoR hTbERNATIoNAL PoLIcY, THE UNrrEi STATEs-CuBA
IMnRomIo: ANATO\MY OF A CRISIS (visited Oct 19, 1996) <httpiJ/vww.us.net/ciplfmbroglio.
html>. The Clinton Administration's earlier opposition to versions of Helms-Burton as
they passed the House (H.927) and Senate (S.381) focused on concerns about, inter alla,
Helms-Burton's potential usurpation of presidential prerogatives in the realm of foreign
affairs. Tom Carter and Warren P. Strobel, Clinton, Hill Unite on Cuba: Deal Reached on
Stringent Sanctions Bill, WAs& TMEs, Feb. 29, 1996, at Al.
82. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 202.
83. Id. §§ 203-04.
84. Id. § 205.
85. See id. § 202(a)(1) (providing for American assistance to Cuba "at such time as
the President determines that a transition government or a democratically elected govern-
ment.., is in pover").
86. See Kirk, supra note 43, at 9-11 (terming Helms-Burton a modem version of the
1820 Monroe Doctrine and pointing out the inconsistency of a contemporary American
trade policy that simultaneously promulgates Helms-Burton and grants most favored nation
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ceive the most international attention and condemnation, for they most directly
affect foreign individuals and corporate citizens.
Titles III and IV attempt to protect American property claims by pressuring
third parties to abstain from trade with Cuba when such commerce involves prop-
erty to which an American claim attaches. "7 Title m confers subject matter juris-
diction on United States district courts, and creates a cause of action for owners of
certified property claims against Cuba to bring suit against those foreign persons
or companies that "knowingly and intentionally traffick in confiscated property of
United States nationals in Cuba."" The American president has the authority to
delay the right to file suits under Title H if the president determines such action
to be in the national interest." President Clinton took such a measure on July 17,
1996, stipulating that the delay would give the Administration an opportunity to
garner international support for the law."' Subsequently, on January 3, 1997, the
status to a nation such as China, whose human rights practices are the subject of regular
international concern). Realpolitik dictates, however, that the comparison only goes so far,
and it is impossible not to recognize the practical differences between China with her bil-
lions of people and global, nuclear power and Cuba, a much smaller and relatively isolated
state. Id. In contrast to the American approach, Canada's commercial policy provides for
the maintenance of trade with other nations in all circumstances short of war. Id. (quoting
former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau).
87. See Lucio, supra note 50, at 328-337 (discussing the scope and limitations of Title
IlI's attempt to protect the property rights of American nationals).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 23 (1995), reprinted in part in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
527, 528. As used in Title Ill, "trafficking" is defined broadly as when an entity knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated prop-
erty, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control ot manages, uses, or otherwise acquires
or holds an interest in confiscated property, (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise
benefiting from confiscated property, or (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking
(as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described
in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the authorization of any United States national
who holds a claim to the property.
H.R. 927, 104th Cong. § 4(13) (1996) (ver. 2). The American plaintiff is entitled to seek
damages calculated at either. 1) the amount of the claim as certified by the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission pursuant to Title V of the International Claims Settlement Act of
1949, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1949), plus interest; or 2) the fair market value of the property at
either its current rate or its worth at the time of confiscation plus interest, whichever is
greater. H.R. 927, 104th Cong. § 302(a) (1996) (ver. 2). Section 302(a)(1)(B)(2) further
creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of the certified claims and Section 302(a)(8)(B)
mandates an amount in controversy over U.S. $50,000, exclusive of interests or costs. Id.
89. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 306(B)(1). The relevant language provides: "The
President may suspend the effective date.., for a period of not more than six months...
[when] the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will
expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." Id.
90. See Sandy Berger et al., Remarks at a White House Briefing (July 16, 1996),
available in LEXIS, U.S. Newswire Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Berger Briefing]
(describing the United States as wanting to use Title Ill as a lever to promote allied acces-
sion to Washington's vision of how best to promote democracy in Cuba), Berger articu-
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President announced that the suspension would endure indefinitely, and he ex-
tended it a third time for another six months on July 16, 1997.1
Title m further creates a private right of action for Americans who were not
citizens of the United States at the time of confiscation but achieved citizenship at
a later date.9 2 Should the American government actually take on these claims,
this would contravene established American practice regarding the internationally
accepted doctrine of espousal, by which a government represents the claims of its
citizens to foreign states.9 " Title It enables the creation of more claims, in addi-
tion to the massive amounts that Cuba owes, and actually may frustrate the reso-
lution of this debt due to Cuba's inability to pay the already exorbitant sum."
The claims of Americans who were United States citizens at the time of the ex-
propriation also will face potential dilution by the claims of Cuban-Americans,
newly allowed under Title I." s
Title IIl destabilizes the climate for international investment by subjecting the
lated the Clinton Administration's position that it plans to work cooperatively with Ameri-
can allies during each six-month period of suspension but will allow the specter of liability
to accrue. Id. Berger also reiterated the United States government's desire to avoid a cycle
of retaliation and counter-retaliation. Id.
91. Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Suspends Provision of Lm That Targets Cuba,
WAsH. POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at Al, A18; Clinton Again Puts OffAny Action Against Cuba:
Helms-Burton Act Title hI Waived for a Third Time, J. OF COM., July 17, 1997, at 2A.
Suspension of Title IH initially was a deft political move from Clinton's perspective: he
supported the law when it was politically expedient in an effort to garner votes in Florida's
primaries; then he effectively emasculated Title IlI in the eyes of many by promising never
to give full effect to the law's most controversial section. See Robert S. Greenberger, U.S.
Holds Up Cuba Suits, Pleasing Few, WAU.. ST. J., Jan 6, 1997, at A9 (noting that the
Clinton administration supported Title I only after Cuban fighter planes shot dow n two
civilian planes -which resulted in four Cuban-American deaths and caused anger in the po-
litically important state of Florida).
92. See Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 302(a)(5)(C) (providing that such a person may
not bring a cause of action for to years from the date of enactment of the statute).
93. See Robert C. Kelso, Espousal: Its Use in International Lawv, 1 Az J. Ir' &
ComP. L. 233, 235 (1982) (noting that from the American perspective, espousal means that
a claimant effectively assigns their claim to the United States government, represented by
the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser, who advocates on the claimant's be-
half). Kelso notes that espousal requires the following:
1) United States nationality of the claimant; 2) the claimant's continuous ownerdiip of thz claim; 3) a
vAwngfu act by the accused nation v tich caused damage to or loss of property 4) reaonable proof
ofthe value of loss or damage to the proplty, 5) exlaustion of all local remedies a%ailable in thz ac-
cased nation; and 6) negation of anticipated defenses to be raised by the acu=d nation.
Id. at 237.
94. See Ratchik, supra note 52, at 359 (noting that a surge in the number of lawsuits
against Cuba could forestall the resolution of Cuban-American property claims).
95. See Matias F. Traviesco-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of
the United States Nationals'Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U. PA. 3. rT'L ECON.
L. 659, 660 (1996) (noting that there would be an inevitable competition for Cuba's finite
resources).
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business practices of a third party, consistent with the laws of its own jurisdiction,
to United States approval and the investments of Americans abroad to similar
measures enacted by other states. 6 Title I may serve to discourage investment
in the United States if a potential investor would not know whether its assets
could be attached pursuant to Helms-Burton."7 Finally, Title III could destabilize
investment in other parts of the world, such as Central and Eastern Europe, if
Congress enacts a similar measure with reference to other formerly Communist
regimes. 8 Potential investors would question whether the property described by a
government had ever been the subject of a non-compensated expropriation and
whether it would, therefore, be amenable to a lawsuit in the United States."
Title IV denies issuance of a visa or exclusion at the port of entry into the
United States to any entity found to be "trafficking" under Title III.10 Title IV's
broad construction 1 ' thus envisions placing as much pressure as possible on
"traffickers" to choose between their Cuban and American business interests.
10 2
Title IV aims to supplement Title I's asserted protection of American property
interests with another incentive for third parties to cease "trafficking."' ' 3 Imag-
ine, however, a major Canadian company choosing to capitalize on enormous
profits garnered from doing business in Cuba and foregoing physical entry into
the United States and the situation exists wherein Title IV harms American inter-
96. Letter from Raymond Chretien, Canadian Ambassador to the United States, to
Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, House International Relations Committee (Feb. 27,
1996), quoted in Hearings on H.R. 927 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 104th Cong.
(1996) (statement of Congressman Tom Campbell (R-CA)) [hereinafter Campbell].
97. Letter from British Ambassador to the United States, to Benjamin A. Gilman,




100. See H.R. 927, 104th Cong. § 401 (1996) (ver. 2) (providing for the exclusion from
American soil of aliens who have confiscated property or who traffic in property to which
the claim of a United States national is attached). The law further provides for the exclu-
sion of individuals who are corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with a control-
ling interest in any such confiscating or trafficking entity and who are the spouse, minor
child, or agent of such an excludable individual. Id. The Senate bill did not include a ver-
sion of Title IV, and the authority to deny visas, discretionary in the House version, was
made mandatory in conference. Hearings on H.R. 927 Before the Comm. on Int'l Rela-
tions, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Af-
fairs), available in LEXIS, Federal News Library, CURNWS File.
101. H.R. 927, 104th Cong. § 401 (1996) (ver. 2).
102. See Stan Crock et al., One Man Against A Tide of Foreign Investment, Bus. WEEK,
May 29, 1995, at 26 (describing the Senate Foreign Relation Committee's press spokes-
man Mark Thiessen as clearly articulating the position that foreign companies must choose
between doing business with Cuba or with the United States).
103. See H.R. REP. No. 104-202, at 25 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S,C.C.A.N. 527,
530 (noting that Title IV excludes persons trafficking in confiscated property of United
States nationals from entering the United States).
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ests without effectively strengthening Title IM.'" In such an instance, Title IV
gains nothing for American policy goals while it promotes missed opportunities
for American commercial interests and financial loss for the tourism industry.
Finally, although it may complicate the title to property in Cuba,"'a "trafficking"
as defined in Helms-Burton does not appear to violate any established norms of
international law. Not only does Helms-Burton threaten the aforementioned un-
desirable results, it also runs the risk of creating retaliatory lawsuits and monopo-
lizing American time and resources to defend the law in multilateral dispute
resolution theaters.' 6 It thus distracts American policy makers from fashioning
an effective and multilateral plan to promote democracy, human rights, and social
and economic freedom in Cuba today.
II. CANADA: CONTENTION AN) ACTION
A. CANADIAN OBJECTION AND THE AmERICAN RESPONSE
Canada claims that Titles I and IV of Helms-Burton violate international
law and are an affront to national sovereignty in their interjection of sovereign
third parties directly into the American-Cuban fray. First, Canada has expressed
concerns over Title Ill's extension of claimant rights to Americans who were Cu-
ban nationals at the time of confiscation."0 Ottaxm correctly claims that this is a
serious contravention of the international law of claims and established American
practice regarding the settlement of foreign claims.' 8 Proponents of the Ameri-
104. See Mark Heinzl, Canadian Will Take His Chances in Cuba: Sherritt Chief Isn't
One to Back Down in Face of U.S. Ban, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1996, at A9 (noting the
Sherritt Chairman's decision that his investments in Cuba are worth foregoing Florida va-
cations with his family and board meetings at Sherritt's Kentucky steel mill).
105. See Brice M. Clagett, Title Lf of the Helms-Burton Act is Consistent With Inter-
national Law, 90 A. J. ITr'L L. 434, 434-36 n7 (1996) (noting then Secretary of State
Warren Christopher's admonition to United States diplomats abroad to warn investors in
Cuba of the potential complication of issues of title that could result from their purchase of
property to which an American claim attaches).
106. See discussion infra parts Il.B-C (elaborating Canadian attacks on Helms-Burton
by creating retaliatory lawsuits in its court system and challenging the law as a violation of
NAFMA).
107. See Robert L. Muse, The Ins and Outs of the Helms-Burton Act: Implications for
Canadian and United States Business, Hms-BuRToN AND hnSNATiONAL Busirmss:
LEGAL AND COmRc.ALvEPCAToNs 21, 22 (1996) (referencing F. Palacio y Compania,
S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)). The court held that, "confiscations by a
state of the property of its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of whether
compensation has been provided, do not constitute violations of international law." F.
Palacio y Compania, SA v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. at 487.
108. See Muse, supra note 107, at 21 (citing a 1971 diplomatic communication from
Ottawa to Havana regarding the resolution of property claims in which Canada stated that,
for purposes of resolving outstanding claims against Havana, it only recognizes as valid
those claims of persons (or corporate entities) who were Canadian citizens at the time of
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can extension of claimant rights base their argument on an individual's entitle-
ment to own property and to be free from its arbitrary deprivation (noted in Arti-
cle 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)."0 9 This argument is un-
convincing, however, for in its zeal to compensate the victims of Castro's
expropriation, it ignores the protocol of espousal."' A state may have a moral
obligation to compensate its citizens for the confiscation of their property, but Ti-
tle 1H may not mandate United States enforcement of such a new international
right on behalf of the world community. Second, Canadians protest the extrater-
ritorial nature of Titles rH and IV as they have protested earlier attempts to export
the American embargo."' Washington defends the international legality of Title
rH" 2 according to the doctrine of "Substantial Effects," '" 3 which allows the exer-
cise of jurisdiction if there is a sufficient nexus between the "trafficking" in con-
fiscated property and the unresolved property claims of American nationals." 4
This argument also is unconvincing when confronted with the doctrine's require-
ment that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable when compared to the inter-
ests of other states."' The American government possesses a valid interest in
the expropriation). See also Ratchik, supra note 52, at nn. 108-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the nationality of claims rule as discussed by the Foreign Settlement Claims
Commission).
109. Clagett, supra note 105, at 438.
110. See Kelso, supra note 93, at 237-39 (explaining the nationality requirement for
espousal).
111. See Selma M. Lussenburg, The Collision of Canadian and United States Sover-
eignty in the Area of Export Controls, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 145 passim (1994) (chronicling
Canada's general frustration with the extraterritorial application of American law regard-
ing Cuba); see also Canadian Business Official Says Lumber Pact Sets Dangerous Prece-
dent, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 683 (Apr. 24, 1996) (illustrating one businessman's ob-
jection to the extraterritorial aspects of Helms-Burton). But see Canada Should Enlist
United States Help in Negotiating Trans-Atlantic Agreement with European Union, Panel
Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1214 (July 24, 1996) (noting that Canada, too, is subject
to a complaint by Spain that it is attempting extraterritorially to extend the effect of Cana-
dian fisheries law into the North Atlantic beyond its jurisdictional limit).
112. See Clagett, supra note 105, passim (defending the American legislation). A full
inquiry into the question of whether Helms-Burton is consistent with international law is
beyond the scope of this Comment. The State Department had previously opposed the
promulgation of laws with extraterritorial implications in order to avoid a disruption of
trade relations and a proliferation of retaliatory legislation. See Kaplowitz & Kaplowitz,
supra note 49, at 234 (noting the State Department's opposition to Senator Connie Mack's
attempt to impose on American subsidiaries a pre-Cuban Democracy Act prohibition on
trade with Cuba).
113. See RESTATEmEN (THiRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrmD STATES
§ 402(1)(c) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEaENT] (providing that a state has jurisdiction over
"conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory").
114. See Clagett, supra note 105, at 436 (noting that Congress frequently legislates
based on the substantial effects idea, notably in the field of antitrust law).
115. RESTATEMEw, supra note 113, § 403(1). The Restatement limits the exercise of
jurisdiction with the mandate that "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law
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promoting the resolution of its citizens' claims, yet Title M is not the appropriate
vehicle with which to pursue this goal given its attempted exercise of jurisdiction
over third parties who are obeying the laws of their states.' Furthermore, Can-
ada submits that it is extaordinary for the United States government to assert an
interest in real property superior to that of the state sovereign.1"
Both Canadian and American arguments ultimately are moot if United States
district courts fail to obtain jurisdiction over any defendants sued pursuant to Title
]I."' Helms-Burton does nothing to change American requirements for the pro-
curement of in personar jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. The threshold
level of minimum contacts with the forum state, as outlined in the landmark case
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington..9 and its progeny, remains a critical
first step to the pursuit of any Title Ell action."'
Ottawa's response to Helms-Burton hinges not only on a desire to affirm Ca-
nadian sovereignty,' 2 but also on the necessity to protect extensive Canadian
business interests in Cuba.' 21 For Canadians, Title M of Helms-Burton is a seri-
ous and potentially destabilizing threat, given the extent of Canadian investment
in Cuba and the money that Canada would lose were this market no longer avail-
with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." Id. Sections 403(2)(a)-(h) describe the factors
which a state actor must consider in ascertaining reasonableness. Id. §§ 403(2)(a)-(h).
116. See id. § 403(2)(h) (stipulating that one must consider "the likelihood of conflict
with regulation by another state" in contemplating the validity of the exercise of jurisdic-
tion). Third parties trading with Cuba do so according to the lawo of theirjurisdiction.
117. See Blair Hankey, Discussion, in Americas and Int'l Pol'y, supra note 43, at 36-37
(stating that the Doctrine of Substantial Effects vould be a stronger argument if there was
a right under international law for the restitution of improperly expropriated property and
noting that there is no such right codified either in Chapter II of NAFTA or the draft text
currently in circulation among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development as part of their discussions on a multilateral agreement on investment).
118. See Implementation of the Cuban Sanctions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong.
(1996) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Esquire, Steptoe & Johnson), available in LEXIS,
LEois Library, CNGTST File (advancing the argument that Title M operates vthin proper
jurisdictional boundaries because it only authorizes lawsuits against those "traffickers"
with the requisite jurisdictional connection to the United States according to the Due Proc-
ess Clause and American case law on personal jurisdiction).
119. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that a defen-
dant must have minimum contacts with the forum such that the suit does not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice). International Shoe further elaborates on
the requirement of minimum contacts according to the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. This threshold must be met in
order for any foreign entity to appear in United States courts for a violation of Title IlL
Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 302(a)(8)(c) (1996).
120. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 302(a)(9)(c).
121. See discussion supra part LB.1 (recalling Canada's desire to chart an independent
foreign policy course in the shadow of its dominant neighbor).
122. Id.
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able.'23 Sherritt International, a Canadian company with a mining investment in
Cuba valued at U.S. $275 million,""' is one of the first foreign business entities
cited by the American government under Title IV.'
The United States Department of State continues to investigate Canadian com-
panies doing business in Cuba and to formulate procedures for taking action
against those deemed to be in violation of Helms-Burton. 2 ' Some businesses may
have no operations or assets in the United States or Cuba that Helms-Burton could
affect, and therefore, may find that the threat of lawsuits is overstated in so far as
their interests are concerned.' 27 Canadian companies that potentially could be
cited under Titles I and IV must choose whether to continue doing business as
usual or to withdraw their Cuban investments quietly and seek to establish com-
mercial ties elsewhere.' 28
B. CANADIAN AMENDMENT OF THE FOREIGN EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES ACT
In 1984, Canada passed the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (FEMA).' 2'
The law authorizes the government to block unreasonable laws or rulings of a for-
123. Id.
124. Tom Carter, EU Members Get Warning on Cuba; State Drafting Sanctions Watch
List, WASH. TIMEs, May 9, 1996, at A15.
125. See Julian Beltrame, Canadian Executives Face United States Ban, OTTAWA
CIIZEN, May 24, 1996, at Al (noting that Sherritt executives received warning letters over
the summer of 1996 from the United States Department of State stipulating that they and
their minor dependants could be excluded from American territory as a direct result of the
company's choice to continue its business operations in Cuba on property deemed to be the
subject of a claim certified by the FCSC); see also Heinzl, supra note 104, at A9 (describ-
ing Sherritt's situation). In May of 1996, the Department of State placed a sample draft of
such an advisory letter on the Interet at: <http'J/www.usia.gov/topical/econIibertad
/libdosal. html>.
126. See First Visa Denials Under Helms Burton Due By End of June, United States
Official Says, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1050 (June 26, 1996) (describing the State De-
partment's "reason to believe" standards of evidence for making the determination of traf-
ficking as lower than a judicial standard).
127. See Cuba: Mining Firm Comments on Helms-Burton, CARRIBBEAN UPDATE, Sept.
1, 1996, available in LEXIS, Naws Library, CURNWS File (noting the public statement of
Holmer Gold Mines, an Alberta based company, that it has avoided 'trafficking" and,
therefore, Helms-Burton is not applicable to any of its operations in Cuba).
128. Berger Briefing, supra note 90 (listing four companies that have chosen to divest
their holdings in Cuba rather than suffer liability under Helms-Burton: Paradors Nacionale
from Spain, Cemex from Mexico, Redpath from Canada, and ING from the Netherlands);
see Juanita Darling & Craig Turner, Tightened U.S. Sanctions on Trade With Cuba Begin
to Have Impact, L.A. TIMas, July 15, 1996, at A2 (stating that the Helms-Burton Act pits
nations' pride against their economic interests); Peter Morton, Nervous Canadian Banks
Loosen Their Cuban Ties, FiN. PosT, June 28, 1996, at 10 (explaining that Canadian busi-
ness will not be able to comply with both Canadian law and the Helms-Burton Act).
129. An Act to Amend the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Bill C-54, 35th Parl.
(1996).
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eign power from application in Canada."' For example, in response to the 1992
Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), Canada issued a blocking order that forbids Cana-
dian subsidiaries of United States companies from complying with CDA and
ceasing trade in goods with Cuba."' In January 1996, the Canadian Parliament
amended this 1992 order to include the protection of trade in services between
Canada and Cuba. 3  FEMA also allows the Canadian government to limit and
control the participation of Canadian nationals in the proceedings of a foreign tri-
bunal... Thus, if Ottawa determines that the tribunal is acting in a manner ad-
verse to Canadian trade and investment interests, it may prohibit or restrict the
Canadian national's production of documents as requested by the foreign tribu-
nal."' Furthermore, FEMA authorizes the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State for External Affairs to require any person in Canada to provide notice to the
Canadian government upon receipt of information or communication from a for-
eign government relating to measures with potential extraterritorial ramifica-
tions.1
35
The House of Commons introduced another amendment to FEMA on October
9, 1996, designed specifically to counteract Helms-Burton's Title Il. 3' s The Ca-
nadian Senate assented to the legislation on November 28, 1996, and it entered
into force on January 1, 1997.13" The coming into force of the FEMA amendment
sets the stage for a test of wills between Canada and the United States, given the
130. See id. § 8(1) (stating that the Canadian Attorney General may declare that any
judgment likely to affect Canadian interests or sovereignty in an adverse manner shall not
be recognized or enforceable on Canadian soil or in its courts of law).
131. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, C. Gaz. 19921L4048. By
prohibiting American owned or controlled corporations registered in Canada from com-
plying with the CDA, the order effectively nullified the law's attempt to force United
States subsidiaries into compliance with an economic embargo against Cuba. Id. The Or-
der also required such corporations to report to the Canadian Attorney General any attempt
to influence their trade with Cuba generated by an American authority pursuant to the
CDA. Id.
132. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures (United States) Order, 1992, amendment, C.
Gaz., 1996.A.611.
133. FEMAAmendment, § 3(1).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 5(l)(a). The statute not only requests that any Canadian national in receipt of
such information inform Ottawa, but also authorizes the Canadian government to prohibit
the Canadian national from complying with any directive from the foreign government. Id.
§ 5(l)(b).
136. See Juliet O'Neill, Liberals Introduce Antidote' Law to Combat U.S. Anti-Cuba
Legislation, OTTAwACITIZEN, Sept. 17, 1996, atA3 (highlighting the provisions that allow
the Attorney General to issue blocking orders against United States court judgments and
allow Canadian companies and citizens to pursue countersuits in Canadian courts to re-
cover judgments and court fees, even before the conclusion of the American suit).
137. FEMA Amendment; see also CANADIAN DEP'T OF FoREIGN AFAs AVID lfrr'L
TRADE, LE SLATION TO COUNTER HEus-BuRTor AcT To Co~m INo FoRca JAiumARY 1
(1996).
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strength of the FEMA amendment's response to Title H.
Canada's legislative response to Helms-Burton is an effective counter to the
American law for three reasons. First, the amendment significantly extends
FEMA's applicable scope from Canada's geographic boundaries to jurisdictions
"related to the enforcement of a foreign trade law or a provision of a foreign trade
law set out in the schedule."138 Thus, Canadian blocking orders may reach Cana-
dian-Cuban commerce taiking place in Cuba.
Second, the amendment creates a cause of action in Canada for entities suffer-
ing adverse Helms-Burton judgments in American courts.' 39 The so-called
"clawback" provision allows these parties14 to seek to recover the amount of the
adverse judgment and any attendant expenses.' 4' This feature of the FEMA
amendment, while appealing to Canadian entities potentially subject to suit under
Title I, carries with it the threat of fueling a cycle of expensive litigation be-
tween American and Canadian claimants.
1 42
Third, the amendment increases the amount the Canadian government can
138. FEMA Amendment, § 3(1). The statute provides:
Where, in the opinion of the Attorney General of Canada, a foreign tribunal has exercised, is exercis-
ing or is proposing or likely to exercise jurisdiction or powers of a kind or in a manner that has ad-
versely affected or is likely to adversely affect significant Canadian interests in relation to interna-
tional trade or commerce involving a business carried on in whole or in part in Canada or that
otherwise has infringed or is likely to infringe Canadian sovereignty, or jurisdiction orpowers that Is
or are related to the enforcement of a foreign trade law or a provision of a foreign trade law set
out in the schedule, the Attorney General of Canada may, by order, prohibit or restrict....
Id. (emphasis added). The original FEMA statute did not contain the emphasized material
and thus was applicable in narrower instances. Id.
139. Id. § 8.1.
140. See id. (providing a right of action for a party who is "a Canadian citizen, a resi-
dent of Canada, a corporation incorporated by or under a law of Canada or a province or a
person carrying on business in Canada").
141. Id.
142. See Ann Davis, Cuba Suit Figures Spark a Spirited Debate, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 28,
1995, at A14 (noting that estimates of the financial cost to the American court system
alone fluctuate from U.S. $2 million to U.S. $1.9 billion). If President Clinton lifts Title
IllI's suspension and allows claimants to file lawsuits, it could cause permanent damage to
the courts of both systems as follows: 1) A United States district court hands down a judg-
ment against a Canadian business entity deemed to be "trafficking" under Title IM; 2) the
Canadian company refuses to comply with the judgment in the face of stiff financial penal-
ties from Ottawa; 3) the Canadian company sues the American party in Canadian courts to
recover the amount of the judgment against it and accompanying court costs; and 4) in the
end, both parties may find themselves without compensation for their property loss or court
costs. Jeff Sallot, Past Retaliation Over Cuba Had No Effect on United States Stand,
GLOBE AND MAIL, June 19, 1996, at A3. If one party is unable to collect from its counter-
part, it may attempt to attach its counterpart's physical property located in its domestic ju-
risdiction to satisfy the judgment. Id. One problem from the Canadian perspective, how-
ever, is that few Cuban exiles have attachable assets in Canada, while many Canadian
companies are involved extensively in both the United States and Cuba. Id.
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levy as fines for noncompliance with FEMA.... This effectively prevents Cana-
dian businesses from ignoring FEMA, in favor of the laws of a foreign jurisdic-
tion, when subject to the jurisdiction of non-Canadian laws which impose higher
financial penalties. The increase in fines is of such a forceful nature that it should
prove to be a significant deterrent from non-compliance with FEMA. The
amendment increased fines for conviction on indictment from Can. $10,000 to
Can. $150,000 for an individual and Can. $1.5 million for a corporation." ' Fines
for summary conviction rose from Can. $5,000 to Can. $15,000 for an individual
and Can. $150,000 for a corporation.' 4
Should the president of the United States reinstate Title IlL Canada is armed
with the legal countermeasures of FEMA."" These countermeasures will enable
Ottawa to protect its citizens and investment interests in Cuba and attempt to re-
coup financial losses suffered as a result of an adverse judgment, but will do
nothing to respond to Title IV.""
C. CANADIANMIAsuEs AGAINST HELMs-BURTON IN NAFTADisprrE
RESOLUTION FORA
Canada's arguments that Helms-Burton violates the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are sufficiently compelling to wrant attention.
Chapter 20 of NAFTA outlines the tripartite process by which a party may seek
143. FEMA Amendment, § 7(1).
144. Id. § 7(1)(a).
145. Id. § 7(1)(b).
146. See supra notes 129-145 and accompanying text. In addition to FEMA and its
1996-97 amendments, see Bill C-339, The United Empire Loyalists Land Reclamation Act
(Godfrey-NMliken Bill), 35th Parl., 2d Sess. (1996) (proposing to compensate descendants
of United Empire Loyalists who fled the United States When their property vas confiscated
without compensation in the American Revolution; to establish a right of action in Cana-
dian courts to bring suit against those trafficking in such property; and to exclude such traf-
fickers from Canada); 60 Minutes: 1776AndAll That (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 20,
1996) (transcript on file with author) (reiterating, with humor, the Canadian position that
Helms-Burton offends their sense of sovereignty). The Bill is a tongue-in-cheek protest of
Helms-Burton. See, e.g., Canada: People and Places--Canadians Get in On the Act,
LLOYDS LisT, July 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File; David
Crary, Canadian BillMocks Helms-Burton, WASH. Tnmns, Oct 23, 1996, at Al1; Clyde H.
Farnsworth, In Canadians'Retort on Trade, Politics of the Absurd, N.Y. T.IES, July 28,
1996, at 6; Graham Fraser, Two MPs Mock Helms-Burton Lma, GLoBE A MA1L, July 25,
1996, at Al 1; Howard Schneider, Canada Spamns a Helms-Burton Spoof, Lamakers Seek
Restitution for Those Whose Kin Fled United States Revolution, VASL PosT, July 25,
1996, at A24; Walter Stewart, Fighting Fire With Fire, ToRoro SuN, June 24, 1996, at
11.
147. See Canadian Parliamentarians Criticize Anti-Helms-Burton as Inffective, 13
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1496 (Sept 25, 1996) (expressing the frustrations of members of
Parliament at the lack of legislative response to Title IV of Helms-Burton, nwhich currently
affects numerous Canadians).
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redress under the auspices of the trade agreement's dispute resolution proce-
dures.148 The process begins with consultations, moves to mediation, and may
proceed to a third phase of non-binding arbitration. 4 ' The day that President
Clinton signed Helms-Burton into law, the Canadian International Trade Minister
wrote to the United States Trade Representative, formally requesting consultations
under NAFTA.'5 Canada informed the United States of the bases for its chal-
lenge to Helms-Burton during consultations held in Washington on April 26,
1996."1
Canada alleges, inter alia, that Title HI of Helms-Burton destabilizes the cli-
mate for international investment in a fashion that is inconsistent with Chapter 11
of NAFTA, which focuses on investment, services, and related matters."5 2 Spe-
cifically, Canada claims that Helms-Burton violates Article 1102's nondiscrimi-
nation obligations and Article 1105's minimum standards of treatment."' Article
1102 provides that each NAFTA party is to accord national treatment to Cana-
dian, Mexican, and American investors and their investments. 54 Canadian offi-
cials contend that, given the American prohibition on the investment of capital in
Cuba as a result of the economic embargo, Title I amounts to de facto discrimi-
nation against Canadian and Mexican investors engaged in activities that are le-
gal in their home states.' 55
The American response is that no provision of Helms-Burton forbids Title Im
from application against an American found to be "trafficking." 5 6 On balance,
this position is weaker because, given the uncontroverted fact that the economic
148. NAFTA, supra note 8, ch. 20. Article 2005 of NAFTA provides that a Party may
choose to pursue redress under the dispute resolution mechanisms of either NAFTA or the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, art. XXIII:2. Id. art. 2005.6. Once the
Party selects a forum, however, it must pursue that forum to the exclusion of any other, See
id. (referencing Articles 2005.3 and 2005.4 for varying procedures for disputes relating to
environmental and conservation agreements, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and
standards related measures).
149. See id. arts. 2006-08 (describing the procedures for consultation, initiation of for-
neal conciliation and mediation, and requests for arbitral panels); FoLsoM & FoLsoM, supra
note 8, at 222 (explaining the tripartite process of consultation, mediation before the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission, and arbitration before a five-member panel of experts).
150. Allan Thompson, NAFTA Invoked in Cuba Dispute, ToRoNTo STAR, Mar. 13,
1996, atA6.
151. Hankey, supra note 117, at 36.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1102.1. The language provides that "[e]ach Party shall
accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expan-
sion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments." Id.
155. Hankey, supra note 117, at 36.
156. See Kenneth L. Bachman et al., Anti-Cuba Sanctions May Violate NAFTA, GATT,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 11, 1996, at C3 n.12 (noting, however, that Helms-Burton will most
likely be applied to foreigners).
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embargo prohibits Americans from direct trade with Cuba, the American gov-




Article 1105.1 of NAFTA requires uniform, equitable, and fair treatment of in-
vestments made by investors of NAFTA parties in accordance with international
law." 8 Thus, any challenges to Helms-Burton based on an asserted violation of
international law also could support a charge that Helms-Burton violates Article
1105."s ' Canada protests what it interprets as the illegal assertion of American
jurisdiction over Canadian investment in and trade with Cuba."' The Canadians
also could assert that the pursuit of any successful claim in American courts under
Title III is tantamount to an expropriation of Canadian investment property and
interference with the right to conduct free trade in contravention of Article
1110.161
Canada is concerned that Title IV of Helms-Burton may constitute a violation
of Chapter 26 of NAFTA, which deals with the entry and free movement of busi-
ness persons.62 between the borders of Canada, Mexico, and the United States.Y
3
The American government potentially could defend Title IV by invoking national
security or existing authorities exceptions to NAFTA. 64
For purposes of Canadian-American relations, the existing authorities argu-
157. Id.
158. NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1105.1. "Each Party shall accord to investments of in-
vestors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security." Id.
159. See discussion supra part ILA (regarding Canadian claims that, inter alia, Helms-
Burton is an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction that violates the international law of
claims, espousal, and settlement).
160. Hankey, supra note 117, at 36.
161. Id. (referencing NAFTA, art. 1110). This Article stipulates that:
No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an invezor of another
Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or *rapriatica of seuh an in-
vestment ("ex'propriation"), except (a) for a public purpoAe (b) on a nondiscrimfiny baais, (c) in
accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); (d) on pa)meat of companzion in accor-
dance vith paragraphs 2 through 6.
NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1110.
162. See NAFTA, supra note 8, art. 1603 (providing that "[e]ach Party sh-al grant tem-
porary entry to business persons who are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable
measures relating to public health and safety and national security"); see also CANADIAN
DEP'T oFFoicr AFAms AND ITh'L TRADE, CANADA, THE NoR-HA.Nm A iMAIR T AND
NAFTA (1996) (visited Oct 22, 1996) <httpJi/www.ustr.gov/reportsontel1996canada.
html> (highlighting that, from the perspective of the Canadian government, the key provi-
sions of NAFTA are the elimination of tariffs, national treatment, secure market access,
dispute settlement, government procurement, business travel, and intellectual property
rights).
163. Hankey, supra note 117, at 36.
164. Bachman, supra note 156, at C3. There also is a question regarding vdaether the
national security provision of NAFTA, Article 1603: Grant of Temporary Entry, is self-
judging or subject to determinations by a NAFTA dispute resolution panel. Id.
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ment recognizes that NAFrA parties must let businesspersons from other NAFTA
countries into their geographic territory when such persons otherwise comply with
existing immigration regulations on temporary entry in effect as of January 1,
1989.65 Correctly, Canada would state that Helms-Burton was ineffective at that
date, and therefore, it may not stand as reasonable grounds to exclude a business
person from American soil.1" The following reply of the United States evi-
dences the interjection of foreign policy into the American immigration code.
The United States could rely on a provision of immigration law that, when
broadly construed, allows the government to exclude from its territory "any aliens
or of any class of aliens [if their entry]... would be detrimental to the interests of
the United States."" 7 Such a rebuttal provides a legally valid defense of Ameri-
can actions, but one that bespeaks of ex post facto justification.
The same critique also exists regarding a second defense of Title IV under a
national security exception to NAFTA." 8 The United States could argue that its
actions are justified according to Article 2102 of NAFTA, which allows actions
that any Party "considers necessary for the protection of its essential security in-
terests."
169
Finally, Washington contends that NAFrA dispute resolution fora are inap-
propriate venues in which to bring Helms-Burton grievances. 7 ' The American
position is that Helms-Burton is a foreign policy issue and NAFTA is an institu-
tion designed to address trade disputes, such as allegations of dumping and the
reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods and serv-
ices.'17 '
165. See id. and accompanying text (noting that Canada and the United States define
"existing" to include when the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement entered into
force in 1989).
166. Id.
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(0.
168. See United States Agrees to Talk With Canada, Mexico on Helms-Burton Cuba
Sanctions Measure, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 476 (Mar. 20, 1996) (describing Cuban
actions affecting United States national security interests). The use of "national security"
as a defense for any action under NAFTA establishes a precedent that the United States
may be unwilling to set, fearing a slippery slope that other nations will follow in the future
by attempting to base every decision on considerations of national security. Lowell R. Flei-
scher, NAFTA Round-Up, LATJAM. L. & Bus. REP. (Aug. 31, 1996), available in LEXIS,
Newsletter Library, CURNWS File.
169. See NAFTA, supra note 8, ch. 21, art. 2102 (providing the basis for defense of
American actions on national security grounds).
170. See Stuart Eizenstat, Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State
for the Promotion of Democracy in Cuba, Remarks at a Press Conference at the United
States Mission to the European Union, Brussels, Belgium (Sept. 4, 1996) (transcript on
file with author) [hereinafter Eizenstat Remarks] (describing the belief of the United States
that injection of a political and policy issue into a trade forum is counterproductive).
Eizenstat explained the American desire to support, rather than weaken, NAFTA at a time
when it is the subject of considerable debate in the domestic political scene. Id.
171. Id.
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I. RECOMENDATIONS
A. LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
Given Canada's recent antidote legislation and NAFTA challenge, the
United States should perform a cost-benefit analysis to decide if Titles M and IV
of Helms-Burton are worth the deteriorating relationship with its primary trading
partner. Evidence exists that Helms-Burton is accomplishing its goal of deterring
foreign investment in Cuba."" The question remains: At what cost?
On a macro level, complete dislocation of the solid Canadian-American rela-
tionship is unthinkable. Arguably, there are no better allies in the world than
Canada and the United States whose interests frequently converge." The two
countries trade extensively, and the Canadian and American economies are in-
creasingly linked in a post-NAFTA world.'" For many years, the two allies co-
existed and prospered with divergent Cuban policies in place. 7 ' On a micro
level, however, Helms-Burton has generated a great deal of bilateral friction that
the Canadians perceive as undermining expectations seemingly settled under
NAFTA.' 6 The strength of the Canadian reaction underlines the seriousness of
the current collision course and the requirement of continued attention from Ot-
tawa and Washington.
Congress should consider severing Titles IlI and IV of Helms-Burton from
the law."' Alone, Titles I and II serve as forceful policy statements, but as their
focus is on the United States-Cuba relationship, they do not risk further alienation
of American trading partners.1 8 Titles III and IV unwisely make other foreign
policy objectives of the United States subservient to the goal of Castro's down-
faM17
9
After the international uproar surrounding Helms-Burton,"'o the American
172. See Heather Scoffield, Canadian Firms in Cuba Duck For Cover, MonmFAL GAZ.,
May 23, 1996, at E2 (noting, inter alia, that some Canadian companies are finding it diffi-
cult to obtain letters of credit from their banks due to increased fears of litigation in the
United States).
173. See discussion supra part I (detailing the close relationship between Canada and
the United States).
174. See discussion supra part LA (describing futher the Canadian-American relation-
ship).
175. See discussion supra part LB.1-2 (recounting the relationships vith and divergent
policies of Canada and the United States tovard Cuba).
176. See discussion supra parts IIA-C (detailing the Canadian responee that Helms-
Burton violates the international agreement).
177. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 5.
178. See discussion supra part LB.3 (detailing Titles I and Il of the Helms-Buxton Act).
179. HRR. REP. No. 104-202, at 53 (1995), reprinted in part in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527,
551.
180. See discussion supra part LB.3 (describing international uproar concerning Helms-
Burton).
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government will lose face if it does not somehow enforce Title I. On several oc-
casions, the Clinton Administration declared its firm intention to give complete
effect to all provisions of the law.181 Given this fact, the legislative branch is
likely to be unwilling to sever Title I completely from the law. Proponents of
Title I view it as a brilliant legal tool, allowing liability for "trafficking" to ac-
crue, while providing the American president with a renewable right to suspend
the ability to sue. This situation allows a claimant to prepare a case, while hold-
ing the Sword of Damocles over the head of a foreign defendant who never knows
whether the president will extend the suspension or disallow any further continu-
ance and cause the "trafficker" to become amenable to suit overnight in an
American court. President Clinton's January 1997 statement that he intends to
suspend Title I indefinitely 82 appears to be an effort to walk the middle ground
and obtain measurable progress in allied efforts to promote democracy in Cuba in
exchange for the continued deferral of Title HI.
This perspective may provide a second, more practical option for the United
States. If Congress is unwilling to sever Title HI, President Clinton should con-
sider its permanent suspension.'83 Such an alternative would allow the United
States to save face, while easing the concerns of Canada and other members of the
international community. To retain dignity on this matter, the United States must
successfully obtain concrete measures from both our European and Canadian al-
181. See Stanley Meisler, U.S. Allies Are Up in Arms Over Law on Cuba Trade, L.A.
TIMEs, June 7, 1996, at A2 (referencing the statement by State Department spokesman,
Nicholas Bums, that Helms-Burton is settled American law and the United States govern-
ment fully intends to implement it to the best of its ability).
182. See Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Suspends Provision of Law That Targets Cuba,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1997, at Al, A18 (noting Clinton's statement that he expected to ex-
tend the suspension of the right to sue if America's friends continue increased efforts to
promote democracy in Cuba). But see Thomas W. Lippman & Howard Schneider, Clinton
"Skeptical" on Canada-Cuba Pact, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1997, at A26 (noting that on Jan.
23, 1997 Canada and Cuba announced the development of a fourteen point program of co-
operation on human rights issues and Clinton's response was muted); see also Douglas
Farah, Cuba Signs Broad Pact With Canada: Ottawa's Envoy Blasts U.S. Law, Offers Co-
operation on Rights, WASH. PosT, Jan. 23, 1997, at Al, A22 (describing a proposed pro-
gram of seminars and academic exchanges); Commerce and Terrorism... Commerce and
Human Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1997, at A22 (arguing for an even greater connection
between commerce and human rights than that which the allies have demonstrated thus far
in their dealings with Cuba following the second to the most recent suspension of Title fII).
183. See Anthony Wilson-Smith, Clinton's Concession, MAcLA's, July 29, 1996, at 14
(noting the statement of a senior adviser to Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien that a
Clinton victory in the recent presidential election supports the chances for an indefinite
postponement of Title I). The Canadians were hoping for such a development all along.
Canada, however, has thus far verbalized continued disappointment in the continued exis-
tence of Helms-Burton and reiterated its opposition to the law's alleged extraterritorial
imposition of United States foreign policy onto other nations. Lippman, supra note 182, at
Al.
[12:4
1997] HELMS-BURTONAND CANADIA N-AME RICAN REL4TIONS 763
lies to work with Cuba in the promotion of democracy.18 4
If Title IV remains in force, United States lawmakers should reconsider the
definition of who is liable for exclusion under this provision. As written, Title IV
is overbroad and excludes minor children and spouses along with "traffickers.""0 5
Congress should consider deleting family members from Section 401(4).r'6 The
current construction can only serve to further alienate American allies.
B. FOREIGN POLICY CoNSIDERATIONS
The United States should reconsider Cuba's place in contemporary
American strategic policy and determine its relative importance vis-A-vis other
global priorities. 8 ' The United States frequently states its goal of working mul-
tilaterally for the economic advancement and political liberalization of the Cuban
184. See Thomas W. Lippman & Paul Blustein, Administration Offers Compromise to
Europeans Over Helms-Burton Act, WASI. POsT, Apr. 11, 1997, at A23 (describing a
Clinton Administration proposal to press Congress to dilute Titles I and IV in exchange
for the European Union postponing its WTO complaint for six months and accepting the
premise that corporations should not profit from investing globally in properties taken by
governments without compensation); see also Paul Blustein & Thomas W. Lippman, Trade
Clash on Cuba is Averted: U.S.-Europe Pact Seeks to Ease Helms-Burton, WAs. PoST,
Apr. 12, 1997, at Al, A20 (noting that the understanding emerged at the eleventh hour,
immediately prior to the April 14, 1997 deadline for the Europeans to file their first WTO
submission). Any understanding, however, is tentative and lacking key details such as ex-
actly what European "action against dealings in property confiscated by Havana and other
regimes" means, and the breadth of any proposed extension of trade restrictions bzyond
Cuba. Id. This development amounts to the buying of time, and it remains to be seen what
role Canada mill play.
185. Helms-Burton, supra note 2, § 401(a)(4).
186. See Ratchik, supra note 52, at 371 (exploring this issue in regards to a previous
version of the law (S.381, § 301(a)(D)(lV)) and also considering the opposing viewpoint
that, perhaps, including such dependents increases the pressure on foreign investors to re-
consider their business dealings with Cuba). As it now stands, Section 401(a)(4) excludes
from the United States persons who have nothing to do with business decisions. Id. Thus,
Congress could amend Section 401(a)(4) to read as follows:
(4) is an agent of any person described above. The Secretary of State may vaive this prolblition on a
case-by-case basis vuen he determines that it is in the national interest to do s.
If the word "agent" is inserted after "controlling shareholder" in Section 401(a)(3), Con-
gress could delete Section 401(a)(4) entirely. This would make logical s as Section
401(a)(3) pertains to business relationships, and it is unnecessary to include family mem-
bers with those who have a professional relationship with Cuba and -,ho make financial
and strategic decisions on behalf of a corporate entity. Congress could amend Section
401(a)(3) to read as follows:
(3) is a corporate officer, principal, controlling shareholder, or agent for a compy or entity involved
in such confiscations or conversions or irafficking.
187. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992: Hearings on H.R 4168 Before the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong. (1992) (statement of Jorge L Dominguez, Gov't
Prof, Harv. U.), reprinted in Irinsky & Golove, supra note 14, at 175.
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people.188 The framework established in Titles HI and IV of Helms-Burton, how-
ever, is ill-suited to multilateralism as it creates enormous daily conflicts with
United States allies. It, further, is ill-suited to the American constitutional sys-
tem's separation of powers when it seeks to harness the judiciary to legislative or
executive foreign policy goals. 89 Helms-Burton's imposition of the American
court system between the Cuban communities in the United States and Cuba may
exacerbate, rather than alleviate, tensions between the two communities during
any resolution of the outstanding property claims.19
The United States should reform its outdated Cuban policy and work within a
multilateral framework to negotiate the normalization of relations with Cuba. 9'
For thirty years, the United States justified its economic policy on the grounds that
Cuba allied itself with the Soviet Union and supported third world insurgencies,
sometimes with the use of Cuban troops.1 2 Today, Cuba no longer poses a real-
istic national security threat to the United States.' 93
Given that American policies isolating Cuba have failed to achieve redress for
the outstanding American property claims, the United States should consider ne-
gotiating a compensation agreement with Havana.' There is an element of ur-
188. See Paige Bowers, Special Envoy Will Push Cuba Policy to American Allies:
Eizenstat to promote Helms-Burton, WASH. Tnmis, Aug. 16, 1996, at A16 (noting the
statement by National Security Coumcil spokesman Dave Johnson that operating multilat-
erally is generally more effective than pursuing unilateral policies).
189. Muse, supra note 107, at 23.
190. Id. at24.
191. See EIR. REP. No. 104-202, at 53-54 (1995), reprinted in part in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 551-52 (noting that the list of individuals opposed to Cuba's further
isolation includes former President Richard Nixon, former Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger, former National Security Adviser Zbigiew Brzezinski, William F. Buckley,
Jr., and Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias, the former President of Costa Rica); see also Christo-
pher Marquis, Eight Former Members of Congress Urge Ending Embargo Against Cuba,
WAsH. PosT, Jan. 11, 1997, at A12 (noting the recent report by former, bipartisan lawmak-
ers detailing support for increased engagement of Cuba as a better mechanism for the ef-
fective promotion of Cuban democracy). This involves confidence building measures on
both sides, such as the increase of Track II programs to increase contacts between the two
civil societies, as well as Cuban movement to release prisoners of conscience or invite the
International Committee of the Red Cross to inspect the island's detention facilities. Id.
192. Krinsky & Golove, supra note 14, at 135.
193. See Former Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, Remarks at a Press
Briefing (Jan. 21, 1992) reprinted in Krinsky & Golove, supra note 14, at 169-70 [herein-
after McNamara] (noting that as one spending years of his life concerned with the Soviets
and the Cubans, McNamara felt confident in expressing that no Cuban threat to the United
States exists today). McNamara's remarks followed a series of academic exchanges in
which he participated, wherein the Cubans were willing to discuss topics such as the dis-
continuity of their previous relationship with the Soviets, past attempts to subvert govern-
ments in the hemisphere, and Cuban aspirations for the next thirty years. Id.
194. See generally Traviesco-Diaz, supra note 95, at 659 (examining a variety of ways
in which to address these claims). Most discussion of negotiated settlements revolves
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gency, however, to settling the American property claims issue as soon as possi-
ble.'95 Legislators must rewrite United States law to legalize lifting the embargo
or normalizing relations.1"6 Compensation is further complicated by the fact that
Havana is rapidly seeking, and receiving, international investment"' This
clouding of the title to properties subject to American claims increases the com-
plexity of the compensation issue198 and strengthens the argument for the swift
conclusion of an agreement. Critical components of any negotiated settlement
include the immediate halt of further development of properties to which Ameri-
can claims are attached and the revision of Helms-Burton and the various antidote
laws recently written by objecting nations.
The Cuban government claims it consistently acknowledged its obligation to
the American property claimants and made several overtures in the past, all re-
jected by Washington. 99 Critics of this position point to past Cuban intransi-
gence to state that Cuba is not now, and never was, interested in such a dialogue
with the United States."' To such critics, one could reply that perhaps Castro's
interest would be sharper now in the post Cold-War environment The latter po-
sition finds support in a statement of Castro himsel ,20 who may be interpreted as
a pragmatist at heart.
202
An extensive relationship with both the United States and Cubae0 3 uniquely
around a date in the future when a hypothetical, post-Castro government is in power. Id.
195. Id. at 669-71.
196. Id. at 669.
197. See Claggett, supra note 105, at 435 (noting a 1993 communication by then Sec-
retary of State Warren Christopher to American diplomats abroad, ,,rning that foreign
investment in properties allocated by American claims complicates restitution).
198. Id.
199. See Hernandez Interview, supra note 54 (positing Cuba's villingaess to settle the
outstanding claims of other nations); see also Tmviesco-Diaz, supra note 95, at n.3, n.5
(noting statements by the President of the Cuban Parliament and former Foreign Minister
Ricardo Alarcon regarding Cuba's willingness to pay claims).
200. See Arturo Villar, Cuba Shoots Down its Options, WoRDPAPE, Apr. 1996, at 8,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (noting examples from both the 1970s
and 1980s in which Cuba missed opportunities for a negotiated dialogue vith the United
States).
201. SEBASTIANBALFOUR, PROFES rN PomE CAsmo 67-68 (1995). Balfour includes
the following somewhat romantic statement by Fidel Castro:
I came to power with some preconceived ideas about the United Stats and about Cuba's relantion:ip
with her. In retrospet, I can see a number of things I vish I had done differently.... Still, cven ad-
versaries find it useful to maintain bridges between them. Pefps I burned some ofthz bridies pr,-
cipitately; there were times when I may have ben more abrupt, more agrewiv., than was called for
by the situation. We were all younger then; we made the miakes of youth.
Id. at 68.
202. See id. at 94-95 (describing Castro's actions in aligning Cuba with the Soviet Un-
ion and touting Moscow's line during the 1968 invasion of what Nss then Czechoslovakdia
as being dictated by, for example, realpolitik and economic concerns).
203. See discussion supra parts LA., LB.1 (detailing the relationship Canada possesses
with Cuba and the United States).
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places Canada in a position to function as an intermediary in any negotiations
between Cuba and the United States aimed at settling the outstanding American
property claims." 4 Assisting the Americans and Cubans in the creation of a
compensation commission or a negotiated program of payment, is in Canada's
best interest."' The sooner American and Cuban relations achieve a measure of
normalization, the likelier it is that the United States Congress may sever Titles
I and/or IV from Helms-Burton (leaving only Titles I and II as an expression of
American policy). Canada, therefore, would not find itself confronted with the
need to take any actions under its FEMA amendment and could perhaps even re-
vise it.
CONCLUSION
The goal of placating American allies is not an adequate foundation for
American foreign policy choices. American legislators, however, should con-
struct laws which express our foreign policy in a practical and effective manner.
Titles II and IV of Helms-Burton are neither practical nor effective. They result
in a degree of conflict with American allies that is not balanced by an adequate
measure of progress in achieving the law's stated goals. Rather than effectively
promoting democracy in Cuba, Titles I and IV are poorly conceived. Further-
more, what good is Title I if political concerns require it to exist in a state of in-
definite suspension? Attempting to maintain a dual position regarding Title 1Il,
where the United States simultaneously lauds and suspends the provision, only
serves to discredit the legislation.
Canada's antidote legislation effectively nullifies Helms-Burton and accelerates
an American-Canadian collision course that disrupts the two countries' solid bi-
lateral relationship and NAFTA expectations. The competing laws threaten the
expenditure of precious resources in international dispute resolution fora, the im-
position of retaliatory countersuits, and a destabilization of the climate for inter-
national investment. Canada and the United States possess the opportunity, how-
ever, to fashion a pragmatic approach for the future from the wreckage of collided
Cuban policies. Since Cuba is no longer a viable national security threat to the
United States2" and has made progress toward market reform, the time is ripe for
the United States government to listen to the voices of moderation and negotiate a
204. But see PETER McKENNA, CANADA AD TEE OAS: FROM DnxTrraT TO FuLL
PARTNER 148 (1995) (noting Canadian disinterest in acting as an intermediary in United
States-Cuban relations after initially indicating that the Canadians function in such a ca-
pacity). This scenario, however, existed before either the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act or
1996's Helms-Burton. Id. Arguably, the extraterritorial reach of these two laws serves as
an incentive for Canada to change its mind.
205. See Eizenstat Remarks, supra note 170, at 2 (discussing the notion of a quid pro
quo whereby in exchange for concrete allied measures to press for democracy in Cuba, the
United States considers the indefinite suspension of Title MII (spoken of here in the context
of Europe)).
206. McNamara, supra note 193, at 169-70.
[12:4
1997] HELS-BURTONAND CANADL4N-AMERICANRELATIONS 767
compensation agreement with Cuba to resolve outstanding American property
claims. Discretion is the better part of valor and negotiation poses a better chance
of protecting the interests of American citizens who have outstanding, certified
property claims than does continued, ineffective confrontation.
